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ENCFORGE Ransomware: Anatomy of an AI-Focused Cyber Attack

ENCFORGE Ransomware: Anatomy of an AI-Focused Cyber Attack

Jul 21, 2026By Prakhar Srivastav6 min read

Summary

ENCFORGE is a newly identified ransomware strain associated with the threat actor JADEPUFFER, representing an evolution in ransomware campaigns by specifically targeting artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning infrastructure. Unlike traditional ransomware that primarily encrypts business documents and databases, ENCFORGE targets critical AI assets, including model checkpoints, training datasets, vector databases, and AI-related files. The attack begins by exploiting the Langflow vulnerability CVE-2025-3248, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution. After gaining access, the attacker performs reconnaissance, identifies valuable AI resources, and deploys the ENCFORGE ransomware payload to disrupt AI workloads and damage critical AI assets.

ENCFORGE specifically targets AI framework files and platforms, including PyTorch, TensorFlow, Hugging Face SafeTensors, ONNX models, GGUF/GGML models, FAISS indexes, and training data formats. By encrypting these assets, ENCFORGE can render AI models unusable and create significant recovery challenges. This attack highlights the growing threat of ransomware campaigns targeting AI infrastructure and intellectual property, emphasizing the need for organizations to strengthen protection for AI models, datasets, and supporting environments against emerging cyber threats.

Background

JADEPUFFER is an emerging threat actor known for using automated and AI-assisted techniques to conduct cyberattacks against organizations, with a focus on compromising AI infrastructure and valuable digital assets. The group represents a shift toward more advanced “agentic” cyber threats, where attackers use automated workflows for reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-compromise activities. JADEPUFFER gained attention after exploiting vulnerabilities in AI-related platforms, including Langflow, an open-source framework used to build AI applications. By abusing security weaknesses such as CVE-2025-3248, the attacker was able to gain unauthorized access, perform environment discovery, search for credentials, and move across compromised networks.

Initially, JADEPUFFER activity involved opportunistic attacks against databases and infrastructure. However, the threat actor later evolved its approach by deploying ENCFORGE ransomware, a tool specifically designed to target AI assets such as models, datasets, and related resources. This shift highlights the growing risk of cyberattacks against AI environments, as threat actors increasingly target AI systems and intellectual property. Organizations adopting AI technologies should strengthen vulnerability management, access controls, monitoring, and backup strategies to reduce the impact of emerging AI-focused threats.

Vulnerability Details

CVE ID CVSS Score EPSS Score Affected Products Vulnerability Type
CVE-2025-3248 9.8 (Critical) 99.97% Langflow < 1.3.0 Code Injection / Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Attack Methodology of ENCFORGE Ransomware Attack

Phase 1: Initial Access through Langflow Exploitation JADEPUFFER gained initial access by exploiting an internet-facing Langflow instance vulnerable to CVE-2025-3248, an unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Successful exploitation enabled the attacker to execute arbitrary commands, establish a foothold on the target system, and prepare the environment for subsequent attack activities.
Phase 2: Reconnaissance & Environment Discovery After gaining access, JADEPUFFER performed automated system discovery to understand the compromised environment. The attacker executed commands such as id, uname -m, and hostname to identify system details, architecture, and host information. Additional reconnaissance focused on locating valuable AI-related resources, including models, training datasets, databases, API tokens, cloud credentials, and other sensitive assets.
Phase 3: Credential & Secret Extraction The attacker searched the compromised environment for sensitive information, including cloud access keys, database connection strings, API tokens, authentication data, and application configuration files. Extracted credentials and secrets were analyzed and leveraged to access additional internal services and resources within the environment.
Phase 4: Internal Service Discovery & Docker Socket Identification JADEPUFFER performed internal service discovery to identify accessible resources and privileged interfaces. The attacker discovered the Docker socket /var/run/docker.sock, which provided direct access to the Docker API and created an opportunity for privilege escalation through container management capabilities.
Phase 5: Docker Privilege Escalation & Container Escape Leveraging Docker API access, JADEPUFFER attempted to escape the container boundary and gain execution capability on the host system. When the direct download of the ransomware binary lockd failed, the attacker developed an alternative container escape method using Python-based scripts executed through the Langflow RCE channel. The final technique utilized a privileged Docker container with host PID mode, host filesystem mounting, and Docker API access to transfer and execute the payload on the host.
Phase 6: ENCFORGE Payload Deployment & AI Asset Discovery The attacker deployed the ENCFORGE ransomware payload, identified as the lockd binary. The malware is a compiled Go 1.22.12 executable packed with UPX 5.20. Unlike traditional ransomware, ENCFORGE specifically targets AI infrastructure by scanning for machine learning assets, including PyTorch, TensorFlow, SafeTensors, ONNX models, GGUF/GGML models, FAISS indexes, and training datasets.
Phase 7: AI Resource Encryption & Operational Impact Before encryption, ENCFORGE performs an initial validation scan using the --try-run option. The ransomware then launches the encryption process using the --lock command, encrypting targeted AI resources and appending the .locked extension to affected files. This prevents access to critical AI models, datasets, and related resources, causing significant disruption to machine learning operations.
Phase 8: AI Infrastructure Disruption & Extortion Following successful encryption, JADEPUFFER disrupts AI workloads by preventing access to valuable intellectual property, trained models, and supporting datasets. The attack impacts organizations by affecting operational continuity, delaying AI development processes, and creating recovery challenges for compromised environments.
Phase 9: Autonomous Attack Adaptation Throughout the intrusion lifecycle, JADEPUFFER combines automated reconnaissance, credential discovery, privilege escalation, and payload deployment techniques to adapt its approach based on the compromised environment. Failed actions are replaced with alternative methods, allowing the operation to progress from initial exploitation to AI asset encryption with limited manual intervention.

JADEPUFFER represents a shift from traditional infrastructure-focused ransomware toward specialized attacks targeting AI environments. The campaign combines exploitation of CVE-2025-3248, automated reconnaissance, credential harvesting, Docker escape techniques, and the ENCFORGE ransomware payload to compromise AI workloads. By specifically targeting machine learning models, datasets, and AI development resources, the operation creates significant operational disruption and threatens valuable organizational intellectual property.

Evolution of JADEPUFFER Ransomware Campaigns

Prior Campaign
│
├── Database-only encryption
├── Python scripts
├── Single production server
└── Credential theft (AI keys)

                ↓ Evolution

Latest Campaignch
│
├── Hybrid AES-256-CTR + RSA-2048 encryption
├── Go-based ransomware
├── Filesystem-wide encryption (~180 extensions)
└── Destructive targeting of AI/ML assets

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Network Indicators

TypeIndicator
Source45.131.66[.]106 (AS49453, Netherlands)
C234.153.223[.]102 (GCP), port 9191
Binary Deliveryhxxp://34.153.223[.]102:9191/.lockd
Staged Interpreterhxxp://34.153.223[.]102:9191/pv/bin/{python,python3,𝜋thon}
Bitcoin Contacte78393397[@]proton[.]me

Binary Hashes (SHA-256)

FileSHA-256
lockd (Packed, UPX 5.20)8cb0c223b018cecef1d990ec81c67b826eb3c30d54f06193cf69969e9a8baea2
lockd (Unpacked, Go 1.22.12)ea7822eac6ecef7746c606b862b4d3034856caf754c4cf69533662637905328
Staged CPython 3.14ab9824b61587c77a8d8649545cdbdc63ed2c384e45c9aba534e3f457f96efa7a

Build-Stable Indicators

TypeIndicator
RSA-2048 DER SHA-2562378bf45bb54fb2defc460063c9b43e09870741b62692b7f6acbc3cd7898bb3
Projectencfile / keygen companion: keyforge
Encrypted File Suffix.locked
Ransom NotesREADME, HOW_TO_DECRYPT, README_DECRYPT

Source: Sysdig

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID Technique Name Tactic
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application Initial Access
T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python Execution
T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files Credential Access
T1046 Network Service Discovery Discovery
T1053.003 Scheduled Task/Job: Cron Persistence
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Command and Control
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact Impact

Visual Attack Flow

Mitigation

  1. Patch Langflow immediately. Upgrade to Langflow version 1.3.0 or later to remediate CVE-2025-3248, which has been added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. Avoid exposing Langflow execution endpoints directly to the internet unless protected by appropriate access controls.
  2. Harden the container environment. Restrict Docker socket access and avoid mounting /var/run/docker.sock into Langflow containers. If Docker socket access is unavoidable, use a scoped socket proxy that permits only required API calls. Run Langflow containers as non-root users, apply noexec protections on writable directories, and monitor for suspicious container-based nsenter activity.
  3. Protect AI model assets. Apply filesystem access controls to model weights and training datasets to prevent unauthorized access from application processes. Maintain offline or immutable backups of production AI artifacts such as .gguf, .safetensors, and .ckpt files, and monitor for unauthorized creation of .locked files in model storage paths.
  4. Secure AI provider credentials. Do not store OpenAI, Anthropic, Hugging Face, or other AI provider API keys in the Langflow runtime environment. Store secrets in a dedicated secrets management solution with strict access controls and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed.
  5. Perform credential hygiene reviews. Audit all credentials accessible to the Langflow process, including environment variables, cloud instance metadata, and local credential files. Rotate any secrets present on systems that previously ran vulnerable Langflow versions.
  6. Implement access controls and network restrictions. Apply least-privilege permissions, restrict unnecessary outbound connectivity, and use firewall or egress filtering controls to reduce the risk of command-and-control activity or data exfiltration.
  7. Monitor for malicious activity. Deploy runtime detection and logging to identify suspicious container behavior, unauthorized code execution, abnormal access to AI model files, credential harvesting attempts, and indicators of compromise associated with exploitation of vulnerable Langflow deployments.

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